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Abstract
In recent years, the emerging paradigm of software-defined networking has become a hot and thriving topic in both the
industrial and academic sectors. Software-defined networking offers numerous benefits against legacy networking systems
by simplifying the process of network management through reducing the cost of network configurations. Currently, data
plane fault management is limited to two mechanisms: proactive and reactive. These fault management and recovery
techniques are activated only after a failure occurrence and hence packet loss is highly likely to occur. This is due to
convergence time where new network paths will need to be allocated in order to forward the affected traffic rather than
drop it. Such convergence leads to temporary service disruption and unavailability. Practically, not only the speed
of recovery mechanisms affects the convergence, but also the delay caused by the process of failure detection. In this
paper, we define a new approach for data plane fault management in software-defined networks where the goal is to
eliminate the convergence process altogether rather than accelerate the failure detection and recovery. We propose a new
framework, called Smart Routing, which allows the network controller to receive forewarning signs on failures and hence
avoid risky paths before the failure incidents occur. The proposed approach aims to decrease service disruption, which
in turn increases network service availability. We validate our framework through a set of experiments that demonstrate
how the underlying model runs and its impact on improving service availability. We take as example of the applicability
of the new framework three types of topologies covering real and simulated networks.
Keywords: Software-Defined Networking, openflow, fault management, risk management, service availability.
1. Introduction
T HE concern about the Internet ossification, whichis a consequence of the growing number of variety
networks (e.g. IoT, WSN, Cloud, etc.) that serve up to
9 billion users around the globe, has led to investigate
for replacing the existing rigid network infrastructure with
programmable one [1]. In this context, Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) has been emerged as a promising solu-
tion for tackling the inflexibility of the legacy networking
systems. In fact, SDN is part of a long history of attempts
that aim to lower the barrier of deploying new innovations
and make the network more programmable. For more on
the history of programmable networks, we refer the inter-
ested readers to [2]. Unlike traditional IP networks, SDN
architectures consist of three planes: control, data and ap-
plication. The control plane, or sometimes called the con-
troller, represents the network brain, which provides the
essential functions and exerts a granular control by relying
on the global view over the network topology, which is a
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crucial feature that has been missed in the past. The data
plane comprises network forwarding elements that consti-
tute the network topology. These forwarding elements are
dictated by the network controller and therefore the en-
tire nodes need to disclose their status periodically to the
controller, hence the global view comes. In general, many
studies have classified the SDN into two layers by consid-
ering the application plane as a complementary part to
the control layer to solve various kinds of network issues
such as firewall and load balance. So far, OpenFlow [4] is
the most widely used protocol that enables the controller
to govern the SDN data plane through carrying the for-
warding rules as well as to capacitate the exchanging of
signals between the two planes. Recently, SDN was not
solely confined to the academic field but also gained the
attraction of industry such as Google and Microsoft [5].
Nowadays, communication networks play a vital role in
human being’s life activities as it represents the backbone
for the modern technologies. Networking equipment are
failure prone and therefore, some aspects like availability,
reliability and fault management are necessary. The term
dependability is the umbrella that encompasses the afore-
mentioned aspects and Figure 1 gives an overall picture
on the dependability taxonomy according to [6]. However,



















Figure 1: The compartmentalisation of dependability concept, [6].
of fault tolerance and forecasting of SDN link failures.
Although SDNs have brought a bunch of benefits with
significant network improvements, some new challenges
that accompanied with this innovation, such as security
[7, 8] and recovery from failure, still need to be addressed
thoroughly in order to maximise the utility of SDNs [9],[10].
Data plane link failure is considered to be a manifold prob-
lem. This is because the controller needs first to be notified
about the failure and then to compute alternative routes
in order to update the affected forwarding elements. The
issue of network link failures is not a recent phenomenon,
as it takes place in everyday operation with variations in
living-time and causes [11]. However, the new architec-
ture of OpenFlow requires more investigation in order to
eliminate the challenges that hamper its growth.
In order to maximise the service availability in SDNs,
we define a new approach that minimises the percentage
of service unavailability by using online failure prediction.
This allows the network controller to perform the neces-
sary reconfiguration prior to the occurrence of failure inci-
dents. Although a number of works on SDN fault manage-
ment have been proposed, none of them has exploited the
global view of SDNs in the context of failure prediction.
With this context in mind, we can summarise the main
contributions of this paper as follows:
• A new network model that allows for the forecasting
of link failures by predicting their characteristics in
an online fashion. This model also demonstrates how
links failure prediction can be integrated into the
process of proactive restoration with the aid of risk
analysis.
• We provide an implementation of the new model in
terms of a couple of fault tolerance algorithms. We
use simulation techniques to test the efficiency of
these algorithms. Our simulation results prove that
the proposed model and algorithms improve the ser-
vice availability of SDNs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section
2 introduces various SDN fault management techniques
from the literature. The problem statement is highlighted
in Section 3. We then present our network model and
framework in Section 4. Section 7 and 8 present the ex-
perimental procedure, observed result and comparison. Fi-
nally, the summary of this paper is provided in Section 9
with some future directions.
2. Related Work
Link failure issue often occurs as a part of everyday
operation. Due its importance and the negative impact it
has on the network Quality of Service (QoS), a consider-
able amount of research has been conducted to analyse,
characterise, evaluate and recover from the frequent issue
of link failure. While, the physical separation of the con-
trol plane from the data plane results into two independent
entities. Both entities are susceptible to failure incidents.
According to [12], control plane failures are more severe
than other failures. This is due to the significant role of
network controller in managing the whole network activi-
ties. For more details about control plane failures, we refer
the interested readers to [13, 14]. However, in this paper,
we are focusing on the data plane link failures only.
Communication networks are prone to either uninten-
tional failures, unplanned, due to various causes such as
human errors, natural disasters like earthquakes, overload,
software bugs, cable cut and so on, or to intentional fail-
ures, planned, that caused by the process of maintenance
[15, 16]. Failure recovery scheme is a necessary require-
ment for networking system to ensure the reliability and
service availability. Generally, failure recovery mechanisms
of carrier-grade networks are categorized into two types:
proactive and reactive. In case of link failure, resilience
mechanism of SDNs ought to redirect the affected flows in
order to avoid the location of failure and keep the system
continue working despite the presence of the abnormal sit-
uation. SDN controller has the ability to mask the data
plane failure either proactively or reactively [17], while
each of them has pros and cons. In this section, we discuss
current efforts to tackle the data plane link failures.
2.1. Proactive
In proactive, which is also know as protection, the al-
ternative paths are preplanned and reserved in advance
(before a failure occurs). According to [18], there are three
protection schemes that can be applied to recovery from
network failure:
• One to One (1 : 1): In which, one protection path is
dedicated to protect exactly one path.
• One to Many (1 : Y): In which, one protection path
is dedicated to protect up to Y paths.
• Many to Many (X : Y): In which, X of specified
protection paths are dedicated to protect up to Y
working paths such that X 6 Y .
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The authors in [19] have implemented an OpenFlow
monitoring function for achieving a fast data plane recov-
ery. In [20], another protection method has been proposed
through using the OpenFlow-based Segment Protection
(OSP) scheme. The main disadvantage of this strategy is
that it consumes the data plane storing capability since the
more flow entries (i.e rules) to be stored the more space will
be used, however, the current OpenFlow appliances in the
market are able to accommodate up to 8000 flow entries
due to the limitation of the Ternary Content-Addressable
Memory (TCAM), thence such a kind of solution is costly
[5, 17], where this issue was discussed in some studies such
as [21, 22]. In addition, the installation of many attributes
in the OpenFlow forwarding elements could lead to dete-
riorate the process of match-and-action for the data plane
nodes. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the preserved
backups are failure-free, in other words, the backup path
might fail before the primary one and resulting a waste in
space and time.
2.2. Reactive
In reactive, which is also called restoration, the possible
alternative paths are not preplanned and will be calculated
dynamically when failure occurs. The authors in [23] and
[24] presented an OpenFlow restoration method to recover
from single-link failures. However, their experiments were
only conducted on small scale network topologies not ex-
ceeding 14 nodes. In [25], the authors have demonstrated
through extensive experiments that OpenFlow restoration
is not easily attainable within 50ms, especially for large
scale networks, unless using the protection technique.
In the same context, some works have utilised the con-
cept of multiple disjoint paths to be employed as a backup.
For example, CORONET [26] is presented as a fault tol-
erance system for SDNs, in which multiple link failures
can be resolved. The ADaptive Multi-Path Computation
Framework (ADMPCF) [27] for large scale OpenFlow net-
works is produced as a traffic engineering tool that capable
to hold two or more disjoint paths to be utilised when some
network events occur (e.g. link failure). HiQoS [28] is in-
troduced as a traffic engineering tool towards better QoS
for SDNs. HiQoS computed multipath (at least two con-
strained paths) between all possible pairs in a network,
hence a quick recovery from a link failure is attainable.
Most of the existing works did not take into account the
processing time of flow entries (e.g. insert, delete and mod-
ify) that need to be updated. Although the performance
of OpenFlow devices are associated with their manufac-
turer specification, in [29], the authors stated that each
single flow entry insertion is ranging from 0.5ms to 10ms.
However, 11ms is the minimum duration that required to
modify a single rule since each modification process in-
cludes both deletion (old rule) and insertion (new one) of
rules [30]. There are a number of studies like [31, 32, 33]
used the OpenState mechanism to recover from data plane
failures without being dependant on the network controller
and hence reducing the overload on controller and speedup
the process of recovery. However, such approaches still in-
applicable as the existing OpenFlow equipment does not
support such customization.
Unlike the existing works, the authors in [34] have dealt
with problem of minimising the time of flow entries that re-
quired to divert from an affected primary path to backup
one. Although, the presented algorithms did not guar-
antee the shortest path from end-to-end, but it opens a
new direction that worth to be explored. Within the same
context, authors in [35] produced new algorithms for min-
imising the required time to update through reducing the
solution search space from source to destination in the af-
fected path. Similarly, in [36] an approach to divide the
network topology into non-overlapping cliques has been
produced to tackle the failure issue in local-based manner
rather than global. Both [35] and [36] took into account
the time required to compute the alternative route in or-
der to speed up the operation of update. While, the main
issue with the last three works is that it does not secure
the shortest path from source to destination.
2.3. Summary
In summary, the previous studies produced different
methods to tackle the problem of data plane recovery from
link failure incidents and for more details about SDN fault
management we refer the interested readers to the recent
survey [12, 37]. Eventually, protection techniques are not
ideal due to the TCAM space exhaustion, whereas the la-
tency issue is the major drawback of the existing restora-
tion methods. As a result, SDN fault management still
needs more research and investigation.
3. Problem Statement
Distinctly, the existing SDN fault management tech-
niques are getting involved after a failure occurrence. Thus,
it cannot prevent a certain impact on traffic flows such as
service unavailability. This problem occurs due to the de-
lay of the convergence scheme TC . We define TC as the
required time to amend a path in response to a failure
scenario. Typically, the convergence time in SDN can be
summarised as a combination of three factors:
• Failure detection time (TD): This is the time required
to detect a failure incident. Comparing with the con-
ventional networking systems, the centralised man-
agement and global view of SDN ease this task by
continuously monitoring the network status and get
notifications upon failures. However, the speed of
receiving a notification is sometimes associated with
the nature of network design and mode of communi-
cation (in-band or out-of-band) [38, 39]. According
to [40], the link failure detection time is ranging from
tens to hundreds milliseconds, which may also rely
on the type of commercial OpenFlow switch.
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• New route computation time (TSP): This is the spent
time when network controller runs a nominated short-
est path routing algorithm (e.g. Dijkstra [41]) to
compute the backup path (usually for the reactive
fault tolerance strategies). The TSP computation
time could reach 10s of milliseconds [35] according
to how big the network is.
• Flow entries update time (TUpdate): This is the time
required to update relevant switches, i.e., nodes in-
volved in the affected path. Again, this factor de-
pends on how many forwarding rules need to be up-
dated after the failure scenario where the amount of
time for every single rule could exceed 10ms.
Accordingly, the resulting convergence time can be calcu-
lated through the following equation:




Currently, the classical SDN fault management meth-
ods aim to tackle the failure after its occurrence, therefore,
the recovery mechanism is activated after the moment of
failure and hence all the previous work proposals embroiled
in a certain amount of delay according to 1. The only way
to completely overcome the three factors of 1 altogether is
by handling the failure before it occurs. Therefore, failure
prediction is required to provide awareness about the po-
tential future incidents as well as allowing the controller to
perform the reconfiguration action in purpose of overriding
failures before causing damage on some paths. Although
there are a number of studies have put efforts on the area
of failure prediction, none of the traditional (except the
work in [42]) and/or the new generation networking sys-
tems has exploited the information that can be gained from
any prediction method to eliminate the network incidents
(e.g. link failures). To the best of our knowledge, [42] is the
only realistic study that discussed the advantages of failure
prediction through producing a risk-aware routing method
for the legacy IP networks. While, our work is differ from
them by building a realistic framework of proactive failure
management for SDNs. Our work combines the concept
of the online failure prediction with risk analysis towards
maximising the network service availability.
4. The Proposed Model
Anticipating failures before they occur is a promising
approach for further enhancement of an SDN failure man-
agement techniques, i.e., the proactive and reactive, in
which the controller responds to failures when they take
place. The SDN proposed model for anticipating link fail-
ure events is presented in this section. We start first by
outlining some of the notations we use in the rest of the
paper, as shown in Table 1. The network topology is mod-
elled as an undirected graph G = (V, E); where V represents
the finite set of vertices (i.e. routers) in G that ranges over






ei j Link traversing any two arbitrary routers i and j
Qptr A pointer that points to first ei j in the Queue
F Failed link set
FR Failed/affected route set
PFL Potential failed link set
PFR Potential failed route set
M Prediction alarm message
CO Network controller
TΩ Threshold of failure probability





CC Cable cut per year
SPx Any shortest path algorithm x in terms of hops
by {vi, vj, . . . , vz} where {i, j, . . . , z} ⊂ {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N ,
and E represents the finite set of bidirectional edges (i.e.
links) in G that denoted as {ei j } where each ei j ∈ E is an
edge that enables vi and vj to connect each other. Now,
we define the following test operational function (OP) over
a link, which reflects the link state as follows:
OP(ei j ) =
{
1 the link is operational
0 otherwise
Therefore F can be defined as follows:
F = {ei j | ei j ∈ E ∧OP(ei j ) = 0}
Based on G, we define a path P as a sequence of consec-
utive vertices representing routers in the network. Each
path starts from a source router, src, and ends with a
destination router, dst:
P = (src, . . . , dst)
We define the set Flow to represent all demand traffic flows
that need to be serviced. Each f low ∈ Flow is an instance
of P, which associates with a particular traffic that are
defined by unique src and dst. We consider f lowset to be
the set of all the possible paths between src and dst that
can be derived from G, which is defined as follows:
f lowset = {P | (first(P) = src) ∧ (last(P) = dst)}
and the definition of first and last is given as functions on
any general sequence (a1, . . . , an):
first((a1, . . . , an)) = a1
last((a1, . . . , an)) = an
We also consider Pset as a set that contains all the admis-
sible paths that can be constructed from G, this means
P ∈ Pset and therefore, Flow ⊂ Pset . When a link failure
is reported in G, we identify the affected routes as follows:
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Figure 2: Online failure prediction and time relations, [45].
FR = { f low | f low ∈ Flow ∧ ∃vi,vj .vi, vj ∈
f low ∧OP(vi, vj) = 0}
In the same context, but this time we consider the case
of when there is a link failure prediction message mi ∈ M
such that M set denoted by {mi}ni=1 where each mi ∈ M is
defined as mi = (ēi j , t), where t is the time when the system
receives mi. In this context, we define the following:
PFL = {ēi j | ēi j ∈ E ∧ ∃mi .mi = (ēi j , t) ∧ mi ∈ M}
to characterise the received link, which we use ēi j to imply
that ei j ∈ PFL is a shorthand, with state of potential to
fail and hence it does not belong to F. Now, we can define
the potential to fail route set as follows:
PFR = { ¯f low | ¯f low ∈ Flow∧(∃ē
i j
.ēi j ∈ ¯f low ∧ēi j ∈ PFL)}
where ¯f low is a f low that has at least one ēi j , in other
words, ¯f low ∩ PFL 6= ∅.
4.1. SDN predictive model
All the previous efforts that dealt with data plane fail-
ures have succeeded in mitigating the impact of failures
(e.g. reduce the downtime) rather than attempting to ob-
viate their effect, such as minimise the service unavail-
ability. Network incidents that cause routing instability,
i.e., flaps, and lead to significant degrading of network ser-
vice availability vary [44, 43]. However, in our case, we are
only concerned with data link failures. By relying on mon-
itoring techniques, some failures can be predicted through
failure tracking, syndrome monitoring, and error report-
ing [45]. Consequently, a set of conditions can be defined
as a base to trigger a failure warning when at least one of
the predefined conditions is satisfied. The following simple


















Online failure prediction strategies vary, such as machine
learning techniques (e.g. using the κ-nearest neighbor al-
gorithm [46]) and statistical analysis methods (e.g. time
series [45], Kalman and Wiener filter [47]). Such tech-
niques can be used to predict the incoming events in short-
term based through relying on the past and current state
information of a system. However, in this paper we do not
intend to propose a failure prediction solution as extensive
studies have been conducted in this field with remarkable
achievements. Instead, employing the online failure pre-
diction as a technique to enrich the current SDN fault man-
agement is one of the main aims of this work. A generic
overview of the time relations of online failure prediction
is presented in Figure 2, which presumes the following:
• ∆td: represents the historical data upon which the
predictor is forecasting the upcoming failure events.
• ∆tl: represents the lead time, which is the time in
which a failure alarm is generated. It can also be
defined as the minimum duration between the pre-
diction and failure.
• ∆tw: is the warning time in which an action may
be required to find a new solution based on the pre-
dicted event. Therefore, ∆tl must be greater than
∆tw so that the information from prediction will be
serviceable. In SDN, the ∆tw should be at least ad-
equate to provide the time required to set up the
longest shortest path in the given G.
• ∆tp: represents the time for which the prediction
will be assumed to be a valid case. This should be
defined carefully by the network operator so as to
identify the true and false alarms after a certain time
window (i.e. ∆tp).
The quality of the failure prediction is usually evalu-
ated by two parameters: FP and FN; whereas, Recall and
Precision are the two well-known metrics that are used to








Table 2: Controller actions based on prediction
Prediction Action
TP Select an alternative route
FP Unnecessary/needless action
FN Call the standard failure recovery
Recall is defined as the ratio of the accurately captured
failures to the total number of the certainly occurred fail-
ures, while, Precision is defined as the ratio of the correctly
classified failures to the total number of the positive pre-
dictions. Correspondingly, SDN controller actions will now
associate with the predicted and unpredicted situations as
listed in Table 2.
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On one hand, every false failure alarm will lead to an
unnecessary reconfiguration for a particular set of routes
in Flow and this will cause unwitting network instability.
On the other hand, a controller needs to deal with the un-
detected failures in a similar way to the classical methods.
Consequently, the more precise behaviour of prediction,
the higher the percentage of network stability and service
availability will be gained. Figure 3 shows the relevance




Figure 3: Relation between prediction and failure sets
4.2. Failure event model
We have implemented an approach of generating failure
events as it is very difficult to find a public network dataset
that includes some useful details like failures, hence, we
adopted an alternative approach by developing our failure
model. This research intends to enhance the SDN fault tol-
erance and resilience through maximising the network ser-
vice availability. Two basic metrics have been exploited in
this model: mean-time between failure (MT BF) and mean-
time to recover (MTT R); which are essential for calculating
the availability and reliability of each network repairable
component [6],[51]. MT BF is defined as the average time
in which a particular component functions before failing,
calculated from:
∑
(startdown time−startup t ime)
number of f ailures ; while, MTT R
is the average time required to repair a failed component.
Each component, i.e., link, is characterized by its own val-
ues of both MT BF and MTT R, which are commonly in-
dependent from other components in the network. As a
consequence of lacking real data, some metrics (such as ca-
ble length and CC) can be alternatively used for measuring
the two availability metrics. According to [51], MT BF can
be calculated as follows:
MTBF(hours) =
CC × 365 × 24
Cable Length
(3)
For instance, when CC is equal to 100 km, it means that
per 100 km there will be on average one cut per year.
Besides this, the MTT R of a link is influenced by its length
[52], which expresses the fact that the longer link has a
higher MTT R value. On this basis, we have designed the
following formula for calculating the MTT R value for each
link in the network.
MTTR(hours) = γ ×CableLength (4)
Where γ is defined as a parameter indicating the time re-
quired to fix the cable, which is measured by hour/kilometer
format. Due to the fact that links are physically dis-
tributed in different locations and environments, therefore,
γ differs from one link to another. In other words, even if
some links have the same length, their γ could be differ-
ent as it relies on the physical location and the ambient
conditions. Further discussion is in Section 6.
5. Risk Analysis
According to [53], risk can be defined as an attempt to
answer the following three questions:
• What scenario could occur?
• What is the likelihood that scenario would occur?
• What is the consequence if the scenario does occur?
We consider these questions towards formulating the risk
of failure in SDNs.
What scenario could occur? The scenario can be de-
fined as any undesirable event such as failure. According
to [54], there are three main types of failure scenarios that
could affect the SDN networking system, these are: con-
troller failure (including hardware and software), commu-
nication components failure (i.e. node and link) and ap-
plication failure (e.g., bugs in application code). However,
this paper considers the scenario of link failure only. Such
scenario, breaks the service down when occurs. There-
fore, finding alternative path is necessary. We define the
set of link failure scenarios as F ranged over by variables
f1, f2, . . . , fn ∈ F.
What is the likelihood that scenario would occur? The
likelihood that a failure scenario disrupts the network ser-
vices is conditional on the occurrence of the scenario. We
address this question by the aid of online failure prediction
that is in our case working based on a scenario’s failure
probability, p. Each failure scenario is associated with a p
value that by nature ranges between 0 and 1, this will be
further discussed in Section 6.
What is the consequence if the scenario does occur? We
address this question by computing the percentage of loss
or consequence, c, that might potentially happen when a
failure scenario is predicted at an early stage. Each failure
scenario might lead to some disconnections and service dis-
ruption. Therefore, the severity of adverse effects of each
failure scenario varies. For instance, c1 that was caused by
f1 might be different from c2 that was caused by f2, which
would reflect the outage costs that would result from dis-
rupting some of the network connections.
Over a period of time, these questions would make a list
of outcomes as exemplified in Table 3, where each ith row
in the table can be represented as a triplet, i.e., 〈 fi, pi, ci〉.
Risk can be estimated by using such information as follows:
Risk = { 〈 fi, pi, ci 〉 }, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5)
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Since we are considering the only link failure scenarios,
f(e
i j
), we shall refine the definition of risk in 5. Accord-
ingly, we redefine the risk to be the chance of damage that
is determined by the combination of the probability of link
failure and its consequence.
Risk f(ei j )
= p(ei j )
× c(ei j ) (6)
To deduce the risk value, the two factors of (6), i.e.,
p and c, can be assessed independently. On one hand,
the probability, p, depends on the efficacy of the online
failure predictor at determining the likelihood of the in-
coming failure scenarios, which is, in this study, defined
by a selective failure probability threshold value, TΩ. On
the other hand, for the consequence, c, it can be measured
based upon the percentage of affected routes that would
result from the anticipated scenario. In our case, we take
the definition of such consequence one of the global net-
work topological characteristics, namely Edge Betweenness
Centrality (EBC) [48]. This is due to the fact that EBC is
a direct indicator of the number of paths that would fail as
a consequence of the failure of a particular link, therefore,
providing a natural measure of risk consequence.
The EBC of a link ei j is the total number of shortest
paths between pairs of nodes that traverse the edge ei j









Where Γvi,v j denotes the number of shortest paths between
nodes vi and v j, while, Γvi,v jei j denotes the number of
shortest paths between nodes vi and v j and go through
ei j ∈ E. For instance, Figure 4 demonstrates an example
topology with an EBC value for each link in the network,
which has been calculated based on Ulrik Brandes algo-
rithm [49]. For instance, the EBC of e
12
is calculated by
the number of shortest paths containing the edge divided
by all possible paths. Therefore, EBCe12 = 0.4. This is be-
cause there are 20 possible paths in the example topology
and 8 of them pass through the edge e
12
. Given that net-
work controller knows the demand traffic matrix between
all pairs in the network, i.e., Flow. Therefore, equation 7




Γ f lowei j
Γ f low
(8)
Where Γ f low denotes the total number of paths in Flow
set, while, Γ f lowei j denotes the number of paths in Flow














Figure 4: Topology example with different EBC values
With the above context in mind, the higher the EBC
value of ei j , which is a normalised value between 0 and
1, the more critical the link is and therefore, the higher
the score indicating the consequences. This is because the
outcome of failure for a link with high EBC will definitely
lead to a huge number of path failures and therefore a
higher percentage of negative impacts on the availability
of network services.
Our goal in this analysis is to gauge the percentage
of possible loss and provide such information to the con-
cerned decision-making mechanism, i.e., the routing mech-
anism in our case. For more details about the existing risk
analysis methods that fit SDNs, we refer the interested
readers to [50].
6. The Proposed Framework
From a high level point of view, Figure 5 illustrates
the main components of our proposed framework where
the Smart Routing (SR) and Prediction Model components
are the primary contribution of our work. We discuss next
in more detail the components we used and developed in
this framework.
(a) SDN controller
The proposed framework supports POX controller [55],
which is an open source SDN controller written in python
and it is more suitable for fast prototyping than other
available controllers such as [56]. The standard OpenFlow
protocol [4] is used for establishing the communication be-
tween the data and control planes, whereas the set of POX
APIs can be used for developing various network control
applications.
(b) Smart Routing
Firstly, this module is responsible for maintaining and
parsing the underlying network topology. Topology pa-
rameters such as the number of nodes and links, way of
connection and port status can be detected via the Link
Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [57], which is one of
the vital features of the current OpenFlow specification.
The openflow.discovery [58], which is an already devel-
oped POX component that can be used to send specially
crafted LLDP messages out of OpenFlow nodes so that the
topological view over the data plane layer can be built.
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Table 4: Service availability and network flows relation
Event Flow src→ dst accessibility TC Serviceability Notes
– f lowx Yes – 4 Path is working
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TD 6 Path is not working
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TSP 6 Search for alternatives
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TUpdate 6 Path is restoring
– f lowx Yes – 4 Path is restored
Figure 5: Architecture of the proposed framework.
This module will then convert the discovered network
topology into a graph G representation for efficient man-
agement purposes. To do so, we utilised the Networkx tool
[59], which is a pure python package with a set of power-
ful functions for manipulating network graphs. When the
network starts working and after shaping the data plane
topology, the shortest path for each f low ∈ Flow is con-
figured by the appointed SPx algorithm, which thereafter
is stored in the Operational Routes table that is specified
to contain all the desired working (healthy) paths.
In order to perceive how the link failure incident could
affect the configured paths from the perspective of service
availability and convergence time, we provide a simple ex-
ample in Table 4 in which the service deterioration of the
f lowx due to link failure incident is highlighted.
To maintain the Operational Routes table, two algo-
rithms have been implemented each with its own view in
respect to keep the Flow maintained. Algorithm 1 de-
picts the baseline shortest path routing strategy (hence-
forth called Baseline Routing (BR)), which is currently
performed by the SDN controller. We specify Dijkstra’s
[41] algorithm, with complexity O(|V |+|E | log |V |), as the
shortest path finder approach for Algorithm 1, which we
denote by SPD instead of SPx . So, the SPD is a Dijkstra
function that can be applied on any f lowset to return only
one unique shortest path.
When the OpenFlow controller reports a link failure
event, every path suffering from that failure will be de-
tected and then two operations will be issued by the con-
troller. First, a Remove, denoted by OFRemove, command
is sent to all the routers that belong to each failed path
Algorithm 1: Baseline Routing (BR)
On Normal: ∀ f low ∈ Flow :
Set Primary Path as flow . f low ∈
SPD( f lowset)
On Failure : Do the following procedure
1 if Link failure reported then




6 OFRemove ( f low)
7 f lowset := f lowset − { f low}
8 f low := SPD( f lowset)
9 OF I nst all ( f low)
10 LF ← f low
11 FR := FR − { f low}
12 while FR 6= ∅;
13 end
14 c := 0
15 if Link repair reported then
16 do
17 if f lowc is currently optimal then
18 Do nothing
19 c := c + 1
20 end
21 if f lowc is currently sub-optimal then
22 OFRemove ( f lowc)
23 f lowc := SPD( f lowcset )
24 OF I nst all ( f lowc)
25 LF := LF − { f lowc}
26 c := c + 1
27 end
28 if number of links = Elen then
29 LF := empty
30 end
31 while c 6 LFlen;
32 end
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in Flow as a step to weeding out the incorrectly work-
ing entries, then an alternative route will be computed for
every affected f low. The new flow entries of the alter-
native path are then forwarded to the relevant routers of
each f low through the Install, denoted by OF I nst all , com-
mand. Each modified f low, i.e., assigned to alternative,
will be stored in a special set that is called the Labeled Flow
(LF), where: LF ⊂ Flow and with length of n. This is to
indicate that each f low ∈ LF is in a sub-optimal state.
The recovery from link failure procedure is demonstrated
in line (1-13). However, the algorithm also includes the
reversion process after a failure is reformed (line 15-32),
which is no less important than the recovery process [60],
and also to take into account the percentage of routing
flaps that is necessary for later analysis. In fact, we devel-
oped this algorithm for comparison purposes only against
Algorithm 2. Therefore, it does not reflect a contribution
of this paper.
In contrast (and unlike Algorithm 1), Algorithm 2 is
one of the main contributions of this work that exploited
the prediction information towards enhancing the service
availability and the fault tolerance of SDNs. This algo-
rithm depends on Bhandari’s algorithm for finding K edge-
disjoint paths [61], which has been utilised as a comple-
mentary to build the smart routing strategy. We denoted
Bhandari’s algorithm as SPB in place of SPx .
Thereon, we consider the SPB as a function that is
specified to compute 2 link-disjoint paths with the least
total cost for any given pair of nodes (i.e. src and dst) or
f lowset . For the purpose of distinguishing between the two
returned paths of SPB, we denote the first path as f lowb1
and the second disjoint one as f lowb2 . The time complex-
ity of SPB is different from the SPD , which is a polyno-
mial that is equivalent to O((K + 1).|E |+|V | log |V |). The
pseudo code of smart routing is demonstrated in Algorithm
2, in which the f lowb1 is initially selected to represent the
primary path for each f low in the network.
The network controller will then start listening to the
prediction module, which will be discussed in the next sec-
tion, for the potential of future incidents. When a new
message (m) is received, the controller will firstly construct
the potential failed list, which contains the information
about link which is expected to fail in the near future as
described in (line 2-4). Secondly, the route (or routes)
which might be affected according to the predicted failure
message will be computed as a preparatory step to replace
them (line 5-7). After identifying the routes that may pos-
sibly fail, the EBC for the predicted link will be calculated
as a step towards measuring the risk (line 8-10). If the
risk value is below the risk threshold, then the prediction
information will be ignored and no action will be taken.
Otherwise, the flow entries of the newly computed disjoint
path from the second step will be installed through us-
ing the Install command. This is done by adjusting the
disjoint path rules with lower priority than the primary
path to avoid the conflict of matching and action process.
Following this step, the forwarding rules of the risky pri-
Algorithm 2: Smart Routing (SR)
Input : Network topology G(V, E), M
Output: PFR ≈ ∅
1 ∀ f low ∈ Flow :
Set Primary Path as f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈
SPB( f lowset)
2 if M = {m} then
3 PFL ← ēi j
4 end















12 OF I nst all ( f lowb2 . f lowb2 ∈ SPB( f lowset))
13 OFRemove ( f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈ SPB( f lowset))
14 while PFR 6= ∅;
15 Wait: ∆tp
16 if ēi j ∈ F then
17 Mark as: TP
18 LF ← PFR
19 else
20 Mark as: FP
21 do
22 OF I nst all ( f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈
SPB( f lowset))
23 OFRemove ( f lowb2 . f lowb2 ∈
SPB( f lowset))
24 while PFR 6= ∅;
25 end
26 end
27 PFR = ∅
28 if [ F = (ei j ) ∧ (ei j /∈ M) ] ∨ [ F =
(ei j ) ∧ (ei j ∈ M) ∧ (Riskēi j < RiskTω ) ] then
29 Mark as: FN
30 Call Algorithm1
31 end




mary paths will need to be deleted in order to use TCAM
resources efficiently.
This needs to be done in a similar procedure to the in-
stallation but with the Remove command as demonstrated
in (line 11-14). After swapping the primary path due to
an expected failure, this action will be considered as the
correct decision for a certain period of time (i.e. ∆tp) as
indicated in line 15. To examine the substantiality of the
changing routes decision, the link that was anticipated to
go down within ∆tl will be compared against the failure
set F. On one hand, and if the link exists, then the pre-
diction will be marked as TP, and each f low ∈ PFR will
be labeled as sub-optimal, in addition, the reconfigured
paths will store in LF(line 16-18). On the other hand, the
prediction will be considered as FP and in such a case it
is necessary to reset the primary path to its initial state
(i.e. optimal) as deliberated in (line 19-25). In case when
there is a failure that was not captured by the prediction
module, such a case is considered as FN and the failure in
such situations is tackled by calling Algorithm 1 as out-
lined in (line 28-30). Finally, Algorithm 1 will also be
invoked when a failed link is repaired (line 32-34).
(c) Prediction Module
In this work, this module is placed on top of the parsed
network topology state that gained from the network con-
troller as a result of lacking historical data. We consider
each link as an independent object of link class. The link
class contains a set of attributes, which currently includes
eight attributes as shown in Figure 6. The link attributes
are used to control the up and down events. In the cur-
rent implementation, we used the priority queue, Q, as a
pool to hold all the non-faulty links. On one hand, equa-
tions 3 and 4 are essential for computing the two static
attributes (MT BF and MTT R) of each link. For 3, we
rely on the topologies information in Section 7.3 and by
assuming that CC equals the minimum cable length in a
network. While, for 4 we used the uniform distribution
to generate γ for each link independently. On the other
hand, the six remaining ones are described as follows:
• ID : a numerical unique value (i.e. 1, 2,. . . , n) as-
signed to the link to represent the link identification
number.
• F Count : a counter to contain the number of times
the link has failed.
• Length : represents the link’s length in km, which is
derived from the topology specification.
• Next F : refers to the next time to failure of link,
which controls the process of moving the link into
and out-of the Q. In other words, this attribute de-
termines the link life span in the Q where the link
will be dequeued when its Next F equals to zero.
• Probability F : registers the current failure probabil-
ity, p, of the link. For instance, the Probability F
of the link ( j) is arrived through: F Count(ID j )∑n
i=1 F Count(IDi)
×
100, where n is the length of Q.
• Status : reflects the current state of the link as either
operational or faulty.
On this basis, we have placed our online predictor scheme,
i.e., represented by Algorithm 3, on top of the priority
queue in order to send encapsulated messages about the
links which satisfy the following two conditions (as de-
scribed in line 2-9):
X The probability of failure is greater than or equal to
the threshold TΩ.
X The leading time (i.e. ∆tl) is less than or equal to
the next time to failure.
Algorithm 3: Alarm message generator (M)
Input : G(V, E)
Output: M
1 while (Q! = ∅) do
2 if Probability F(Qptr ) > TΩ then
3 if FD = True then
4 Go To: 8
5 else
6 Go To: 16
7 end
8 Compute: ∆tl
9 if Next F(Qptr ) > ∆tl then
10 Wait: Next F(Qptr ) −∆tl
11 Generate: (m, ēi j(Qptr ) )
12 else





18 Wait: Next F(Qptr ) = 0
19 end
Failure Decision (FD) is a Boolean function that ran-
domly generates True and False values for each link that
satisfies the threshold condition, i.e., TΩ. When FD is
True, a failure event is generated by putting the current
link, i.e., F(Qptr ), down if ∆tl is satisfied. Otherwise, when
FD is False then no failure event will be generated. Algo-
rithm 3 is used only for evaluation purposes so that True
and False alarms can be made. Hence, the actual link fail-
ure prediction method is outside the scope of this paper.
7. Experimental Design and Implementation
Since smart routing is aimed to enhance the SDN fault
tolerance in the context of network service availability, we
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Figure 6: Representation of links in priority queue
have implemented some metrics for fair comparison be-
tween the traditional SDN and the proposed system. We
also show in this section the adopted network topologies
that have been utilised in our experiments.
7.1. Availability measurements
Considering the convergence time that is required to
shift from a failed or non-operational path to an alterna-
tive or backup one, which conforms with Equation (1).
This convergence process is definitely drive to some dam-
ages in the network availability and causing service un-
availability. This issue results from the unavailability of
the affected path to the service for a certain amount of
time, as demonstrated in Table 4. In order to identify the
serviceable, which are denoted by ”Yes”, and unservice-
able, which are denoted by ”No”, f lows with respect to
some failure events, we formulated this problem as follows:
( f low ∩Q) = f low =⇒ Yes
( f low ∩Q) ⊂ f low =⇒ No
where, ”Yes” and ”No” can be obtained by intersecting
each f low ∈ Flow against the Q. The f low is subjected
to ”Yes” when all its forming edges reside in the Q, oth-
erwise, the f low will be considered as unserviceable and
subjected to ”No”. By knowing the number of service-
able and unserviceable f lows, the service unavailability
and thus the service availability can be measured.
The service unavailability of SDN (USDN ) over a given
interval time with a certain number of failure events, which







Whereas, for smart routing it is important to further con-
sider the impact of Recall values. Hence, the service un-
availability of SR (USR) can be arrived by the following:
USR(Flow,G) = (1 − Recall) × (USDN (Flow,G)) (10)
Consequently, the availability Ax , with x = SDN or SR,
can be arrived through the following:
Ax = 1 −Ux (11)
7.2. Routing instability measurements
In traditional networks, routing protocols (e.g. IGP
[62]) perform two routing changes as a reaction to every
single failure, one time when a failure occurs and another
when a failure is repaired. In fact, both changes are essen-
tial for the QoS where the first change is for the purpose
of service availability, while, the goal of the second one
is to return back from the backup (i.e. sub-optimal) to
the primary (i.e. optimal) path again. In contrast, SDN
architecture brings centralisation and programmability to
the scene, therefore, traditional distributed protocols are
independent of the SDN architecture. Maintaining the op-
timal path (e.g. minimum hops in our case) of each f low
will require a continuously adaptive strategy that will be
responsible for replacing each sub-optimal f low with the
optimal one after it becomes serviceable. To do so, we as-
sume that each alternative f low is additionally stored in
LF as mentioned in Section 6.
For an SDN, the routing flaps (denoted by RF) can be
measured by means of link up (denoted by u f ) and down








On one hand, and according to (12), after each link down
event; a new route for each f low ∈ FR is required, which
then leads to a first routing change for each f low. On
the other hand, and after each link up announcement, the
controller will need to check the state of each labeled f low
in LF to determine if its still the optimal choice. If so, then
no change will be made, otherwise, rerouting is required
and therefore it will result in another routing change.
However, for the smart routing mechanism, it is neces-
sary to consider the three prediction parameters also (i.e.















According to (13), the FN f is equivalent to df in (12)
as it reflects the actual failure events that have not been
captured by the prediction module, while the remaining
are as follows:















































Figure 7: Flow chart of routing flaps
gives the advantage of avoiding an upcoming failure event.
While, the second flap will be similar to the scenario of
RFSDN through inserting the f low into the LF and the
next flap builds upon the link restoration u f .
• Each false prediction leads into two useless flaps, one
when the prediction triggers an alarm, in such a case each
potential f low will be added to the Temporary Labeled
Flow set (T LF), as a transient step before it recognises the
prediction was false. The second flap will perform when
∆tp expires.
We provide a deep overview of the process of measur-
ing the number of routing flaps in the flow chart of Figure
7, which also shows how the LF is adjusted in the scenario
of the two algorithms, i.e., Algorithm 1 and 2. Since all
actions are associated with the link state, in this work,
we utilise the OpenFlow protocol to reflect the data plane
links changing state. This is by relying on the Loss of Sig-
nal (LoS) that detects link failures by depending on Open-
Flow PORT-STATUS messages. In addition, the proposed
prediction module produces further information about the
potential failures. Both LoS and prediction information
will be delivered to the network controller through the
Updater in order to apply the appropriate action as illus-
trated in the above flow chart.
7.3. Simulated network topologies
In order to evaluate the proposed method, we have
modelled 3 network topologies as depicted in Figure 8.
Both, (a) janos-us and (b) germany50 represent real net-
work topology instances that defined in [63]. However,
(a) janos-us (b) germany50 (c) waxman
Figure 8: Experimental topologies.
(c) waxman is a synthetic topology that is created by the
Internet topology generator Brite [64] through using the
well-known Waxman model [65]. Waxman’s model is a ge-
ographical approach that connects the distributed routers
in a plane on the basis of the distance among them, which
is given by the following formula:
P({vi, vj }) = β exp
−d(vi ,vj )
Lα (14)
where 0 < α and β ≤ 1. d represents the distance between
vi and vj , while L represents the maximum distance be-
tween any two given nodes. The number of links among
the generated nodes is associated with the value of α in a
directly proportional manner, while the edge distance in-
creases when the value of β is incremented. We used Brite
to generate a large-scale network topology in comparison
to the others (e.g. when the number of edges or nodes ≥
100). The characteristics of all the modelled topologies are
detailed in Table 5.
Table 5: Topologies’ characteristics
Topology Nodes Edges Minlen(ei j )
Maxlen(ei j )
janos-us 26 42 145 km 1127 km
germany50 50 88 36 km 236 km
waxman 70 140 15 km 1099 km
7.4. Implementation
In order to validate our approach, the proposed frame-
work is built on top of the POX controller. The implemen-
tation code of the current framework is made available on
the Github platform [66]. The proposed framework is eval-
uated by using the container-based emulator, Mininet [67].
Mininet is a widely used emulation system, as evidenced
in a recent survey [5], for evaluating and prototyping SDN






























Figure 9: Flow diagram of a link’s life cycle in the Queue
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Figure 10: Routing flaps and service availability
protocols and applications. It can also be used to create
realistic virtual networks, running real kernel, switch and
application code, on a single machine (VM, cloud or na-
tive). Our experiments were designed based on the topolo-
gies that we illustrated in the preceding section. Since
one of our experimental topologies was designed via Brite,
we utilised the Fast Network Simulation Setup (FNSS)
[68]. FNSS is a python-based toolchain simulator that can
be used to facilitate the process of network experiments.
It provides a wide range of functions and adapters that
allow network researchers to parse graphs from different
topology generators (e.g. Brite) in order to be compati-
ble with and/or to interface with other simulator/emulator
tools, such as Mininet. Based on the failure event model
(Section 4.2), the general reliability theory [69] has been
utilised to generate failure events using the exponential
distribution (mean = MT BF) for the next time to fail-
ure of each link, and lognormal distribution E(µ, σ) with
µ = log(MTT R)−((0.5)×log(1+((0.6×MTT R)2/MTT R2)))
and σ =
√
log(1 + ((0.6 × MTT R)2/MTT R2 for time to re-
cover. Regarding, failure anticipation, false and true posi-
tive have been generated during the simulated time using
the uniform distribution following the specified threshold
value. Figure 9 summarises the simulated link queuing
system that is correlated to the two metrics of reliabil-
ity, i.e., MTBF and MTTR. In order to dispatch the pre-
diction information that is necessarily important to the
SR module, the distributed messages framework (ZeroMQ
[70]) was exploited to carry the alarm messages, M, from
the prediction module to the network controller interface.
In some network f low conditions it will activate the SR
module to begin a possible reconfiguration. In the emu-
lation environment, we employed two servers; one acts as
the OpenFlow controller and the other to simulate the net-
work topologies. For each server, we used Ubuntu v.14.04
LTS with Intel Core-i5 CPU and 8 GB RAM.
8. Comparison and Key Advantages of SR
In this section, we present comparison and evaluation
of the proposed method versus the default SDN technique
(i.e. BR). To do so, the study has been conducted on
the three topologies that were summarised in Table 5. To
simulate the three topologies, we ran the emulator for 144
hours, i.e., each experimental topology was simulated in
the system for 48 hours. Figure 10 shows the obtained re-
sults from the three topologies based on parameter settings
of TΩ = 0.25, Tω = 0.1, ∆tl = 120s and ∆tp = 30s. Keep
in mind, and as discussed earlier, the TΩ and Tω values can
be selected by the network operator or by using additional
algorithms (i.e. machine learning) to identify the near op-
timal values. Since the main goal of smart routing is to
enhance the network service availability, we plot for each
network that which gives the BR and SR mechanisms for
the service availability percentage (Y-axis) and the rate
of routing flaps (X-axis). Furthermore, for SR, the per-
formance of the online failure predictor represented by the
values of Recall and Precision are considered and reported
respectively to each topology. In fact, Recall value has a
crucial impact on the service availability in the SR scheme,
however, Precision value has an impact on the unnecessary
routing changes.
On one hand, it can be clearly observed that SR out-
performed the BR in providing network service availability
for all test cases. In spite of the low Recall values (i.e. 0.2-
0.3), there is still a gain in service availability. It can also
be observed that janos-us topology gained the highest im-
provement percentage in the service availability and this
is because its Recall value is greater than that of the other
topologies.
On the other hand, the rate of the routing flaps gen-
erated by SR is always higher than the BR. This disad-
vantage comes as a trade-off for improving the network
service availability. Given that the routing instability by
means of unnecessary flaps is correlated with the value
Precision, we have measured the only useless flaps that
were generated during the simulation time and for each
topology as shown in Figure 11. Figure 11(a) shows the
only unnecessary routing changes that have been reported
based on the FP rate of each topology, where each single
FP is associated with two useless flaps, that is, one for the
reconfiguration and the other for the reversion. However,
Figure 11(b) shows the percentage of useless routing flaps





























(b) Useless flaps percentage
Figure 11: Routing instability measurements
flaps. In the worst case scenario the routing flaps did not
exceed 25%. Although janos-us topology has the highest
Precision value, it yielded a relatively high percentage of
useless flaps and this is because the number of links in the
topology is low, hence, it is highly likely that each single
link is associated with a large number of routes in con-
trast to the other two topologies. It is also clearly evident
that the online failure prediction plays a significant role
in both service availability (by TP) and routing flaps (by
FP). Based upon the experiments and simulations, we
have some observations, as follows:
• Some alternative routes are considered as optimal af-
ter receiving an update message, even though the received
update is not involved in its conforming path. The rea-
son is that the current system defines the optimal path
based on hops number. Therefore, each alternative path
that has the same number of hops as the optimal one will
be considered to be an optimal path. It might not be the
case if the adopted routing constraint is not the number
of hops, i.e., using a specified cost function with different
parameters such as bandwidth, congestion, energy, etc.
• In some cases the algorithm is barely able to find two-
disjoint paths and therefore, sometimes if a path faces
two successive failure alarms on its forming links, then no
change will be made. Hence, we used (≈) instead of (=)
in the output of Algorithm 2, to imply that an entirely
empty PFR cannot be always guaranteed.
• It is also possible that each f low ∈ LF may face one or
more risky links, thus in such a case the entangled f low
state will be the same (i.e. sub-optimal).
• In some cases and when the Next F < 2 min, the con-
troller will ignore the prediction if it is generated as in such
a case the ∆tl is not satisfied and so the controller will not
have enough time for the preparation process.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has demonstrated the promise of using on-
line failure prediction to enhance the SDN service avail-
ability. Since the network service availability is a well
established research area, its implications for OpenFlow
networks are limited. We presented a new model for SDN
to tackle the problem of data plane link failures. Our work
differs from the existing contributions by allowing the SDN
controller to have a time window to reconfigure the net-
work before the anticipated failure occurs and avoid the
interruption in the availability of network services. We
showed how the proposed model can be implemented us-
ing a couple of new algorithms that extract the risky links
from paths and hence when those risky links fail no path
will be affected. Our experiments were performed over a
number of various types of network topologies conducted
with the link failure event model. The experimental find-
ings demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method
in enhancing the SDN service availability. Unfortunately,
the flaps rate that resulted from the failure prediction may
lead to network instability, especially when it reaches a
high rate. For this purpose, we measured the percentage
of the unnecessary routing changes and in the worst sce-
nario, the rate was 25%, which is nearly reasonable, but
not quite. For future work, we will position the study in
the setting of machine learning, towards achieving that
the decision will be made according to the optimal thresh-
old value of the probability of failure. We are also plan-
ning to extend this study to consider some disaster situa-
tions where drastic failure scenarios can lead to multiple
link failures with high network availability and packet loss
rates. In such scenarios, one needs to consider different,
possibly less predictable, metrics of failure. Additionally,
we plan to consider more complex scenarios where we con-
sider not only link failures but also other forms of failure,
e.g. controller, node and application failures.
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